9.3 AI-enabled dispute resolution system (n-party adjudication)
Motivation
Dispute resolution is the determination of contested claims by applying agreed rules to established facts. It is a prerequisite for high-trust coordination: parties transact more freely when they know disagreements will be resolved predictably and at bounded cost.
Current dispute resolution systems exhibit a cost-quality tradeoff:
- High-quality resolution (experienced adjudicators, thorough process, reasoned decisions) costs 50,000+ per dispute and takes weeks to months. It is economical only for disputes exceeding these thresholds.
- Streamlined resolution (simplified process, less experienced adjudicators) reduces cost but also reduces accuracy and perceived fairness. Parties may reject outcomes or avoid the system.
- Platform-based online dispute resolution (eBay, PayPal, Alibaba) handles high volumes at low cost for narrow dispute types, but is limited to transactions within those platforms and is often perceived as favoring the platform.
- No resolution remains common for disputes where resolution cost exceeds value at stake. In commercial contexts: minor contract breaches, small-value SLA violations, inter-business payment disputes under $5,000. In autonomous systems: protocol violations, resource allocation conflicts, inter-agent coordination failures.
What AI changes: AI can reduce marginal adjudication cost from hundreds or thousands of dollars to single digits, making resolution economical for disputes currently abandoned. The 2024 cost of processing a complex document set and generating a structured decision via LLM is approximately 10 depending on volume, compared to 2,000+ for equivalent human review.
The design challenge: reduce cost while maintaining the structural properties that make outcomes respected.
Trust assumptions required
For AI-enabled dispute resolution to function as a high-trust regime:
Parties must trust:
- Rule fidelity: The system applies the agreed rules—not undisclosed criteria, training biases, or operator preferences.
- Evidence evaluation: Submitted evidence is assessed on relevance and weight as defined by the rules; no party receives preferential treatment based on identity, resources, or relationship to the system operator.
- Process integrity: Counterparties cannot exploit procedural mechanisms or model behaviors to gain advantage.
- Error correctability: Incorrect outcomes can be identified and remedied through appeal or review.
- Confidentiality: Dispute details are not disclosed beyond authorized recipients or exploited by the system operator.
The system must trust:
- Evidence authenticity: Submitted materials are genuine—not fabricated, altered, or misleadingly excerpted.
- Participation good faith: Parties seek resolution of genuine disputes, not procedural harassment or precedent manipulation.
- Outcome compliance: Parties will comply with decisions or accept enforcement.
Each assumption requires structural support. Assumptions that depend on participant goodwill will be violated when violation is advantageous.
Architecture
Participants
- Disputants (): Parties to the dispute; .
- AI Adjudicator (): Automated system evaluating evidence and rendering decisions within delegated scope. May be a single model, an ensemble, or a structured combination (see §Adjudicator Configuration).
- Human Adjudicator (): Human authority for appeals, decisions outside AI scope, and legitimacy-critical determinations.
- Protocol Governance (): Governs the system itself—rule amendments, adjudicator certification, precedent curation, operator oversight.
- Enforcement Mechanism (): Executes outcomes—fund transfer, access modification, state change, reputation update.
Adjudicator configuration
Parties may, at dispute initiation, select from available adjudicator configurations. The goal is dispassionate application of rules—achieved through different structural means:
adjudicator_config:
single_model:
description: "One AI model renders decision"
model: <model_id, version_hash, attestation>
appropriate_for: "routine disputes, low stakes, high volume"
weakness: "single point of failure; model-specific biases undetected"
dual_model_consensus:
description: "Two independently-operated AI models must agree"
models: [<model_1>, <model_2>]
consensus_rule: "unanimous" | "either_may_escalate"
on_disagreement: "escalate_to_human" | "third_model_tiebreaker"
appropriate_for: "moderate stakes; bias detection via disagreement"
weakness: "correlated errors if models share training data or architecture"
panel_selection:
description: "Random selection of k models from pre-agreed list of n"
model_pool: [<model_1>, ..., <model_n>]
selection:
k: 3 # number selected
method: "verifiable_random_selection" # e.g., commit-reveal, VRF
decision_rule: "majority" | "unanimous" | "supermajority"
appropriate_for: "higher stakes; resistance to single-model gaming"
weakness: "increased cost; potential for inconsistent reasoning"
adversarial_pairing:
description: "Each party selects one AI; neutral AI or human resolves disagreement"
party_models: {D_1: <model_a>, D_2: <model_b>}
resolver: <neutral_model> | <human_adjudicator>
appropriate_for: "parties distrust single adjudicator; want advocacy representation"
weakness: "models may be selected for favorable bias; resolver bears full decision weight"
human_ai_hybrid:
description: "AI prepares analysis; human renders decision"
ai_role: "evidence_summary" | "draft_decision" | "issue_identification"
human_role: "final_determination"
appropriate_for: "high stakes; novel issues; legitimacy-critical"
weakness: "higher cost; human availability constraints"
sequential_review:
description: "AI decides; second AI reviews; disagreement escalates"
primary: <model_1>
reviewer: <model_2>
reviewer_scope: "error_check" | "de_novo_review"
on_disagreement: "escalate_to_human" | "detailed_reasoning_required"
appropriate_for: "balance of efficiency and error-catching"
weakness: "reviewer may defer to primary; correlated errors"
Dispassion guarantees:
Different configurations provide dispassion through different mechanisms:
| Configuration | Dispassion mechanism |
|---|---|
| Single model | Model attestation; no party controls model selection |
| Dual consensus | Disagreement reveals model-specific bias; agreement suggests robustness |
| Panel selection | Random selection prevents party manipulation; majority reduces outlier impact |
| Adversarial pairing | Symmetric bias (each party's model); neutral resolver breaks ties |
| Human-AI hybrid | Human judgment on final call; AI handles volume/consistency |
| Sequential review | Independent review catches systematic errors |
Model diversity requirements:
For multi-model configurations, diversity is necessary to prevent correlated failure:
diversity_requirements:
training_data: "non_overlapping" | "partially_overlapping" | "unknown"
architecture: "different_families" | "same_family_different_versions" | "identical"
operator: "different_organizations" | "same_organization"
attestation: "independent_certifiers" | "same_certifier"
minimum_for_bias_resistance:
dual_consensus: "different operators OR different architectures"
panel_selection: "at least 2 different operators among k selected"
Dispute lifecycle
dispute_lifecycle:
1_initiation:
initiator: <disputant_id>
respondents: [<disputant_ids>]
claim:
type: <dispute_category>
facts_alleged: <structured_statement>
rule_violations_claimed: [<rule_ids>]
remedy_requested: <specific_outcome>
rule_set: <rule_set_id, version>
adjudicator_config: <selected_configuration>
evidence_initial: <submission>
filing_fee: <amount, paid_to>
escrow: <if_required_for_enforcement>
2_response:
deadline: <timestamp, e.g., 14_days_from_notice>
for_each_respondent:
response_type: "accept_liability" | "contest" | "counterclaim" | "jurisdictional_objection"
facts_disputed: [<fact_ids>]
defenses: [<defense_types>]
evidence: <submission>
counterclaim: <if_applicable, same_structure_as_claim>
3_evidence_phase:
rounds: <max, e.g., 3>
per_round:
deadline: <timestamp>
submissions: [<per_party>]
challenges: [<to_opposing_evidence>]
responses_to_challenges: [<per_party>]
evidence_close: <timestamp>
late_submission: "excluded" | "admitted_with_explanation_for_delay"
4_evaluation:
adjudicator: <per_adjudicator_config>
inputs:
rule_set: <frozen_at_initiation>
evidence: <all_admitted_evidence>
submissions: <all_party_submissions>
precedent: <relevant_prior_decisions, retrieved>
process:
fact_finding: <determine_disputed_facts>
rule_application: <apply_rules_to_found_facts>
remedy_determination: <select_appropriate_remedy>
outputs:
determination: <structured_outcome>
reasoning: <per_reasoning_requirements>
confidence: <per_fact, per_conclusion>
5_decision:
issued: <timestamp>
content:
findings_of_fact: [<structured>]
conclusions_of_rule: [<structured>]
outcome: <determination>
remedy: <specific_ordered_actions>
costs: <allocation>
reasoning: <full_explanation>
appeal_window: <duration, e.g., 30_days>
6_appeal:
if_invoked:
grounds: <specific_error_claimed>
filing: <deadline, fee>
review_scope: <per_grounds>
reviewer: <per_adjudicator_config_appeal_tier>
outcome: "affirm" | "reverse" | "modify" | "remand"
7_enforcement:
trigger: "appeal_window_expired" | "appeal_exhausted" | "parties_waive_appeal"
mechanism: <designated_at_initiation>
execution: <outcome_effectuation>
confirmation: <verification_of_execution>
8_closure:
record:
retention: <duration>
access: <authorized_parties>
precedent:
extraction: <if_meets_criteria>
anonymization: <per_protocol>
publication: <per_protocol>
Rule specification
Dispute resolution requires rules. AI adjudication requires rules precise enough for machine application.
rule_set:
metadata:
identifier: <rule_set_id>
version: <semantic_version>
effective_date: <timestamp>
supersedes: <prior_version, if_any>
scope:
dispute_types: [<categories_covered>]
party_eligibility: [<requirements>]
transaction_types: [<if_applicable>]
exclusions: [<explicit_carve_outs>]
definitions:
terms:
<term>:
definition: <precise_statement>
examples: [<clarifying_instances>]
counter_examples: [<what_is_not_included>]
evidence_types:
<type>:
format: <specification>
admissibility: <criteria>
weight_factors: [<what_affects_probative_value>]
substantive_rules:
- rule_id: <unique_id>
name: <human_readable>
condition:
predicate: <logical_expression_over_facts>
required_evidence: <what_must_be_shown>
burden: <which_party_must_prove>
standard: "preponderance" | "clear_and_convincing" | "beyond_reasonable_doubt"
consequence:
if_satisfied: <outcome>
if_not_satisfied: <outcome>
priority: <for_conflict_with_other_rules>
exceptions: [<conditions_where_rule_does_not_apply>]
procedural_rules:
deadlines:
response: <duration_from_notice>
evidence_round: <duration>
calculation: <business_days | calendar_days, timezone>
extensions:
grounds: [<acceptable_reasons>]
limit: <maximum_extension>
defaults:
on_no_response: <consequence>
on_no_evidence: <consequence>
remedies:
available:
- remedy_type: <type>
description: <what_it_entails>
prerequisites: [<conditions_for_availability>]
limits: <caps_or_constraints>
selection_criteria: <how_adjudicator_chooses_among_available>
default: <when_no_specific_remedy_fits>
interpretation:
principles: [<canons_of_construction>]
ambiguity_resolution: <method>
gap_filling: <what_happens_when_rules_silent>
ai_limitations:
escalate_if: [<conditions_requiring_human_judgment>]
governance:
amendment:
process: <how_rules_change>
notice: <advance_notice_required>
version_control: <how_versions_are_tracked>
disputes_about_rules: <meta_resolution_process>
AI applicability constraints:
Rules suitable for AI adjudication satisfy:
- Decidability: Given admissible evidence, the rule yields a determinate outcome or explicit indeterminacy (triggering escalation).
- Evidence mapping: The rule specifies what evidence is relevant and how evidence relates to the condition.
- Composability: When multiple rules apply, their interaction is defined.
- Boundary specification: The rule's scope is explicit; gaps are acknowledged, not papered over.
Rules containing undefined terms like "reasonable," "appropriate," or "fair" without further specification are flagged for human adjudication unless the rule set provides operational definitions.
AI adjudicator specification
ai_adjudicator:
identity:
model_id: <identifier>
version: <hash_of_weights_and_inference_config>
attestation:
certifier: <certifying_body>
scope: <what_was_certified>
date: <certification_date>
expiration: <if_applicable>
operator: <organization_running_the_model>
capabilities:
evidence_types: [<formats_model_can_process>]
evidence_size_limit: <maximum_per_submission>
total_context_limit: <maximum_per_dispute>
party_limit: <maximum_n>
rule_set_compatibility: [<rule_set_ids_model_is_certified_for>]
constraints:
decision_scope:
permitted: [<outcome_types_model_may_render>]
reserved_for_human: [<outcome_types_requiring_escalation>]
stakes_limit: <maximum_value_at_stake>
confidence_requirements:
fact_finding_threshold: 0.7 # below this, fact is "not established"
decision_threshold: 0.8 # below this, escalate to human
calibration_method: <how_confidence_is_computed>
calibration_validation: <how_calibration_is_verified>
reasoning_requirements:
must_cite: ["specific_evidence", "specific_rules", "inference_steps"]
must_not: ["external_knowledge", "party_identity_factors", "unstated_premises"]
inference_environment:
determinism:
level: "reproducible_given_fixed_seed_and_environment"
seed_disclosure: "included_in_decision_record"
hardware_specification: <for_reproducibility>
isolation: "no_network_access_during_inference" | "allowlisted_endpoints_only"
input_commitment: <hash_of_all_inputs_recorded_before_inference>
output_signature: <decision_cryptographically_signed_by_operator>
monitoring:
decision_log:
contents: [input_hash, output_hash, timestamp, seed, confidence_scores]
integrity: "append_only_hash_chain"
retention: <duration>
outcome_tracking:
by_rule: <appeal_rate, reversal_rate_per_rule>
by_party_characteristic: <for_bias_detection, see_bias_monitoring>
by_dispute_type: <for_quality_assessment>
anomaly_detection:
patterns_monitored: [outcome_distribution_shift, confidence_distribution_shift, processing_time_anomalies]
alert_threshold: <statistical_threshold>
bias_monitoring:
protected_characteristics: [<defined_by_protocol_governance>]
metrics:
outcome_parity: <difference_in_win_rates>
calibration_parity: <difference_in_confidence_accuracy>
appeal_parity: <difference_in_appeal_rates>
base_rates: <expected_distribution_given_case_mix>
detection_method: <statistical_test>
threshold_for_review: <significance_level>
response_to_detected_bias: "human_audit" | "model_suspension" | "recertification_required"
Confidence calibration:
Confidence scores are useful only if calibrated—i.e., when the model reports 80% confidence, it is correct approximately 80% of the time.
calibration:
method:
training: "temperature_scaling" | "platt_scaling" | "isotonic_regression"
validation: "held_out_test_set" | "ongoing_appeal_outcomes"
validation_data:
source: "historical_disputes_with_known_outcomes"
size: <minimum_sample>
recency: <must_include_recent_disputes>
recalibration_trigger:
schedule: "quarterly" | "after_N_decisions"
performance_threshold: "ECE > 0.1" # expected calibration error
limitation_acknowledgment: >
Confidence calibration is an active research area. Current methods may not
generalize to novel dispute types or adversarial inputs. Confidence scores
should be interpreted as approximate, not precise probabilities.
Evidence protocol
evidence_protocol:
submission:
format:
documents: [pdf, docx, txt, md]
structured_data: [json, csv, xml]
images: [png, jpg, pdf]
multimedia: [mp4, mp3] # if rule set permits
size_limit_per_item: <e.g., 50MB>
total_limit_per_party: <e.g., 500MB>
authentication:
required_level: "cryptographic_signature" | "sworn_attestation" | "self_declaration"
signature_verification: <method>
attestation_liability: <consequences_of_false_attestation>
metadata:
required: [submission_timestamp, submitting_party, evidence_description, relevance_claim]
chain_of_custody:
for_digital_evidence:
hash_at_submission: <recorded>
source_attestation: <origin_of_evidence>
modification_history: <if_applicable>
for_physical_evidence:
not_supported: "digital_submissions_only" | "require_certified_digitization"
admissibility:
type_check: <evidence_type_defined_in_rule_set>
relevance:
standard: "tends_to_prove_or_disprove_disputed_fact"
determination: "by_adjudicator" | "by_rule_mapping"
authenticity:
presumption: "authentic_unless_challenged"
challenge_procedure: <see_challenges>
exclusions:
privileged: [<privilege_types_recognized>]
prejudicial: <if_rule_set_includes_such_exclusions>
procedural: "untimely_submission" | "exceeds_limits"
challenges:
types: ["authenticity", "relevance", "admissibility", "weight"]
procedure:
challenger_submission: <specific_grounds>
response_deadline: <timestamp>
ruling: "by_adjudicator" | "preliminary_by_ai_final_by_human"
consequences:
sustained: "evidence_excluded" | "evidence_admitted_with_reduced_weight"
overruled: "evidence_admitted" | "challenge_noted_for_weight"
weighting:
factors:
source_type:
contemporaneous_record: "higher_weight"
after_the_fact_statement: "lower_weight"
third_party_neutral: "higher_weight"
party_generated: "lower_weight"
corroboration:
multiple_independent_sources: "increased_weight"
single_source: "baseline_weight"
specificity:
detailed_and_specific: "higher_weight"
vague_or_general: "lower_weight"
application: "by_adjudicator_per_rule_set_guidance"
fraud_deterrence:
detection:
cross_reference: <checking_consistency_across_submissions>
metadata_analysis: <detecting_manipulation_artifacts>
statistical_anomaly: <unusual_patterns_in_submission>
external_verification: <where_possible, e.g., public_records>
penalties:
for_fabrication: "case_dismissal" | "adverse_judgment" | "system_exclusion" | "referral_to_authorities"
for_material_omission: "adverse_inference" | "reduced_credibility"
for_misleading_presentation: "adverse_inference" | "cost_sanctions"
limitation: >
Evidence fraud detection is imperfect. Sophisticated fabrication may escape
detection. Penalties apply when fraud is discovered; undetected fraud
remains a system vulnerability.
Reasoning and explanation
Decisions must be explicable. Unexplained outcomes cannot be evaluated, appealed, or trusted.
reasoning_specification:
structure:
findings_of_fact:
for_each_disputed_fact:
fact_id: <id>
description: <what_was_alleged>
finding: "established" | "not_established" | "undetermined"
evidence_basis:
supporting: [<evidence_citations_with_quotations_or_descriptions>]
opposing: [<evidence_citations>]
resolution: <why_supporting_outweighs_opposing_or_vice_versa>
confidence: <score_with_interpretation>
rule_application:
for_each_applicable_rule:
rule_id: <id>
condition_analysis:
elements: [<condition_components>]
per_element:
satisfied: true | false
by_facts: [<fact_ids_establishing_element>]
conclusion: "rule_triggered" | "rule_not_triggered"
outcome_derivation:
from_triggered_rules: [<rule_ids>]
conflicts_resolved: <if_multiple_rules, how_resolved>
remedy_selection:
available_remedies: [<per_triggered_rules>]
selected: <remedy>
rationale: <why_this_remedy>
precedent_consideration:
relevant_precedents: [<precedent_ids>]
application: <how_precedents_informed_decision>
distinctions: <if_departing_from_precedent, why>
requirements:
completeness:
every_disputed_fact: "must_have_finding_with_evidence_basis"
every_finding: "must_cite_specific_evidence"
every_rule_application: "must_cite_specific_facts"
every_conclusion: "must_follow_from_stated_premises"
prohibitions:
no_unstated_premises: true
no_external_knowledge: true # only evidence in record
no_party_identity_factors: true # unless legally relevant
no_speculation: true # only established facts
transparency:
confidence_disclosure: "required_for_each_material_finding"
uncertainty_acknowledgment: "required_where_present"
alternative_interpretations: "noted_where_reasonable"
format:
human_readable:
summary: <plain_language_overview, 1-2_paragraphs>
full_reasoning: <complete_structured_explanation>
machine_readable:
schema: <json_schema_for_structured_reasoning>
linkage: <evidence_ids_linked_to_finding_ids_linked_to_rule_ids>
verification:
trace_available: "full_inference_trace_on_request"
reproducibility: "re_running_adjudicator_on_same_inputs_yields_same_output"
Precedent system
Prior decisions inform future disputes. Precedent improves consistency and predictability but creates risks around confidentiality and manipulation.
precedent:
extraction:
criteria:
novelty: "interprets_rule_in_new_context"
significance: "affects_future_disputes"
quality: "reasoning_meets_publication_standard"
exclusions:
default_judgments: "excluded"
settled_before_decision: "excluded"
party_requests_exclusion: <per_protocol_rules>
extractor: "human_review" | "ai_extraction_with_human_approval"
anonymization:
required_removals:
party_identities: "replaced_with_generic_labels"
identifying_details: "generalized_or_redacted"
confidential_business_information: "redacted"
re_identification_risk:
assessment: "required_before_publication"
threshold: "publication_blocked_if_risk_exceeds_X"
mitigation: "additional_generalization" | "delayed_publication" | "restricted_access"
limitation: >
Anonymization reduces but does not eliminate re-identification risk.
Parties with knowledge of specific disputes may recognize them despite
anonymization. Highly distinctive fact patterns may be identifiable.
storage:
format: "structured_searchable_database"
fields: [fact_pattern_abstract, rules_applied, holdings, reasoning_summary, date, adjudicator_config]
access:
ai_adjudicators: "full_access_for_retrieval"
parties: "search_access" | "restricted"
public: "published_subset" | "none"
application:
retrieval:
method: "semantic_similarity" | "rule_based_matching" | "hybrid"
relevance_threshold: <minimum_similarity_for_inclusion>
max_precedents: <limit_to_prevent_context_overflow>
weight:
binding_vs_persuasive: <defined_by_rule_set>
recency: "recent_precedents_weighted_higher"
adjudicator_tier: "human_decisions_weight_higher_than_ai_only"
distinguishing:
requirement: "if_departing_from_relevant_precedent, must_explain"
valid_grounds: [factual_distinction, rule_change, prior_error]
evolution:
correction:
process: <for_precedent_later_deemed_erroneous>
effect: "prospective_only" | "retroactive_review_available"
obsolescence:
trigger: "rule_change" | "superseding_decision" | "time_limit"
marking: "obsolete_precedents_flagged_in_retrieval"
manipulation_resistance:
collusion_detection:
method: "pattern_analysis_of_filings_and_outcomes"
limitation: "sophisticated_collusion_difficult_to_detect"
review: "precedent_setting_decisions_subject_to_human_review"
Appeal mechanism
appeal:
availability:
right: "automatic" | "discretionary" | "by_leave"
fee: <amount>
fee_allocation: "refunded_if_appeal_succeeds" | "non_refundable"
grounds:
permitted:
procedural_error:
definition: "process_rules_were_not_followed"
examples: [missed_deadline_not_enforced, evidence_improperly_excluded, wrong_adjudicator_config]
evidence_error:
definition: "evidence_was_materially_misread_or_ignored"
examples: [clear_evidence_not_cited, evidence_misconstrued, weight_grossly_inappropriate]
rule_error:
definition: "rule_was_misapplied_or_misinterpreted"
examples: [wrong_rule_applied, rule_condition_misread, exception_ignored]
reasoning_error:
definition: "conclusion_does_not_follow_from_stated_premises"
examples: [logical_gap, contradiction, unsupported_inference]
new_evidence:
definition: "material_evidence_unavailable_at_original_hearing"
requirements: [explain_unavailability, show_materiality]
prohibited:
mere_disagreement: "must_identify_specific_error"
weight_of_evidence: "unless_grossly_unreasonable"
credibility_determinations: "unless_no_reasonable_basis"
filing:
deadline: <e.g., 30_days_from_decision>
requirements:
specific_error_identification: "required"
supporting_argument: "required"
proposed_outcome: "required"
deficient_filing: "rejected_with_opportunity_to_cure" | "rejected_final"
process:
respondent_reply:
deadline: <e.g., 21_days_from_appeal_filing>
content: "response_to_claimed_errors"
reviewer:
first_appeal:
from_single_ai: "different_ai_or_human"
from_ai_panel: "human_reviewer"
from_human: "appellate_human_panel"
second_appeal: "if_permitted, human_panel"
review_scope:
procedural_error: "de_novo"
evidence_error: "abuse_of_discretion"
rule_error: "de_novo"
reasoning_error: "de_novo"
new_evidence: "remand_for_consideration"
timeline: <e.g., decision_within_60_days>
outcomes:
affirm: "original_decision_stands"
reverse: "opposite_outcome"
modify: "change_remedy_only"
remand: "return_for_reconsideration_with_instructions"
finality:
exhaustion: "decision_final_after_appeals_exhausted_or_waived"
enforcement_trigger: <upon_finality>
escalation_triggers_automatic:
- ai_confidence_below_threshold
- stakes_exceed_ai_authority
- novel_fact_pattern_detected_by_retrieval_failure
- rule_gap_identified
- party_invokes_human_review_right
- outcome_would_create_significant_precedent
- adversarial_pattern_suspected
Enforcement integration
Resolution without enforcement is advisory. Effective enforcement requires integration with mechanisms that can effectuate outcomes.
enforcement:
mechanism_types:
financial:
escrow:
requirement: "parties_deposit_before_dispute_or_at_initiation"
release: "to_prevailing_party_per_decision"
shortfall: "judgment_recorded; collection_outside_system"
payment_instruction:
integration: <payment_processor_api>
authorization: "pre_authorized_at_system_enrollment" | "per_dispute"
failure: "recorded; alternative_enforcement"
bond_claim:
against: "performance_bond_posted_at_enrollment"
process: <bond_terms>
access_control:
permission_modification:
scope: "within_integrated_systems"
types: [revocation, attenuation, suspension]
reversibility: "if_decision_overturned"
platform_standing:
consequences: [reduced_privileges, increased_scrutiny, exclusion]
reputation:
outcome_publication:
to: "system_reputation_registry"
content: "outcome_only" | "outcome_and_reasoning_summary"
party_consent: "required" | "waived_at_enrollment"
compliance_record:
tracking: "decision_compliance_status"
consequences: "non_compliance_affects_future_disputes"
state_modification:
smart_contract:
if_applicable: "decision_triggers_contract_state_change"
irreversibility: <per_contract_design>
registry_update:
authoritative_registries: [<integrated_registries>]
external_referral:
to_courts:
when: "enforcement_requires_legal_authority"
facilitation: "system_provides_decision_record"
to_regulators:
when: "violations_implicate_regulatory_concerns"
pre_commitment:
at_enrollment:
parties_designate: "available_enforcement_mechanisms"
parties_authorize: "execution_of_outcomes_via_designated_mechanisms"
at_dispute_initiation:
confirm_or_modify: "enforcement_designation"
escrow_requirement: <if_applicable>
execution:
trigger: "decision_final"
automation_level:
full: "execution_without_human_confirmation"
confirmed: "human_confirms_before_execution"
manual: "human_executes"
timeout: <deadline_for_execution>
failure_handling:
retry: <attempts>
alternative: <fallback_mechanism>
recording: "non_execution_recorded; affects_party_standing"
reversal:
if_decision_overturned:
financial: "reverse_transfer_if_possible"
access: "restore_permissions"
reputation: "update_record"
state: "depends_on_reversibility_of_original_change"
limitations:
jurisdictional: >
Enforcement mechanisms operate within integrated systems. Cross-border
enforcement, enforcement against non-integrated assets, and enforcement
requiring legal compulsion depend on external legal systems and may not
be achievable through this protocol.
practical: >
Enforcement against judgment-proof parties or parties who exit the
ecosystem may be ineffective. System design assumes parties have
stake in continued participation.
Cost allocation
cost_allocation:
fee_types:
filing_fee:
amount: <fixed_or_scaled_to_claim_value>
paid_by: "initiating_party"
purpose: "deter_frivolous_filings; fund_system"
response_fee:
amount: <if_applicable>
paid_by: "responding_party"
adjudication_fee:
amount: <based_on_adjudicator_config_and_complexity>
initial_allocation: "split_equally" | "paid_by_initiator"
appeal_fee:
amount: <higher_than_filing_fee>
paid_by: "appellant"
final_allocation:
default_rule: "loser_pays" | "each_pays_own" | "split" | "proportional_to_outcome"
adjudicator_discretion: "may_adjust_for_party_conduct"
factors:
frivolous_claims: "claimant_bears_all"
frivolous_defenses: "respondent_bears_all"
mixed_outcome: "proportional_allocation"
procedural_abuse: "abusing_party_bears_costs"
fee_waiver:
availability: <if_system_provides>
criteria: <financial_hardship; meritorious_claim>
transparency:
fee_schedule: "published"
estimated_cost: "provided_at_initiation"
Multi-party disputes
For disputes involving parties:
multiparty:
configurations:
bilateral_with_third_party_interest:
structure: "primary_dispute_between_two; third_party_affected"
third_party_role: "intervenor" | "amicus"
joint_claimants:
structure: "multiple_parties_with_aligned_claims_against_respondent(s)"
representation: "joint_or_separate"
outcome: "joint_judgment_or_severed"
joint_respondents:
structure: "claimant_against_multiple_respondents"
liability: "joint_and_several" | "several_only" | "allocated"
cross_claims:
structure: "respondents_have_claims_against_each_other"
procedure: "consolidated_with_main_dispute"
multi_polar:
structure: "multiple_parties_with_non_aligned_interests"
complexity: "highest"
procedural_adaptations:
evidence_visibility:
default: "all_parties_see_all_evidence"
alternatives:
bilateral_confidential: "evidence_visible_only_to_submitter_and_adjudicator"
need_to_know: "evidence_visible_to_parties_affected_by_claims_it_supports"
response_sequencing:
simultaneous: "all_parties_respond_by_same_deadline"
sequential: "ordered_response_schedule"
consolidated_vs_severed:
criteria: "related_claims_heard_together_unless_prejudicial"
determination: "by_adjudicator_at_case_management_phase"
alignment_determination:
method: "self_declaration" | "adjudicator_determination"
disputes_about_alignment: "resolved_by_adjudicator"
consequences: "aligned_parties_may_share_costs_and_representation"
outcome_structure:
per_party_findings: "findings_specific_to_each_party"
joint_findings: "findings_applicable_to_multiple_parties"
liability_allocation:
among_co_liable: "percentage_allocation"
joint_and_several: "any_party_liable_for_full_amount"
remedy_allocation: "specific_to_each_party_or_shared"
contribution:
among_co_liable: "party_who_pays_more_may_seek_contribution"
enforcement: "through_separate_dispute_or_integrated"
Bootstrapping
The system requires initial rules, certified adjudicators, and participant trust—none of which exist at launch.
bootstrap:
rule_set_creation:
initial_drafting:
by: "protocol_governance" | "founding_participants" | "external_expert_body"
process: "drafting → comment → revision → adoption"
legitimacy_source: "expertise" | "participant_consent" | "regulatory_endorsement"
minimum_viable_rules:
scope: "limited_dispute_types_initially"
expansion: "add_rules_as_precedent_accumulates"
adjudicator_certification:
initial_certifiers:
problem: "who_certifies_the_first_certifiers"
solutions:
external_authority: "regulatory_body_or_recognized_standards_org"
founding_consortium: "initial_participants_jointly_certify"
reputation_import: "certifiers_with_reputation_from_other_domains"
initial_ai_models:
certification_basis: "performance_on_synthetic_disputes" | "performance_in_other_adjudication_contexts"
limitations: "no_in_system_track_record; higher_escalation_rates_initially"
participant_trust:
early_participants:
incentives: "lower_fees" | "influence_on_rules" | "first_mover_advantage"
risk_tolerance: "higher_than_later_participants"
trust_building:
transparency: "publish_all_non_confidential_decisions_and_outcomes"
track_record: "accumulate_appeal_rates_reversal_rates_compliance_rates"
external_validation: "third_party_audits_of_system_performance"
graduated_scope:
initial:
stakes_limit: <low, e.g., $10,000>
dispute_types: <narrow>
adjudicator_config: "human_ai_hybrid_only"
expansion_triggers:
track_record: "N_disputes_resolved_with_<X%_reversal_rate"
participant_growth: "M_active_participants"
stability: "no_major_failures_for_T_months"
expansion_steps:
increase_stakes_limit: <progressive>
add_dispute_types: <based_on_demand_and_rule_development>
enable_ai_only_adjudication: <for_qualifying_disputes>
Governance
governance:
protocol_authority:
composition:
options:
nonprofit_entity: "dedicated_governance_organization"
consortium: "representatives_of_participant_classes"
dao: "token_weighted_or_reputation_weighted_voting"
hybrid: "combination"
requirements:
diversity: "no_single_stakeholder_class_dominates"
expertise: "includes_technical_legal_and_domain_expertise"
accountability: "removal_mechanism_for_underperformance"
responsibilities:
rule_management: "propose, review, adopt rule changes"
adjudicator_certification: "certify_and_decertify_adjudicators"
precedent_curation: "review_precedent_quality_and_consistency"
system_monitoring: "oversee_performance_metrics_and_bias_monitoring"
dispute_about_system: "resolve_meta_disputes"
constraints:
no_individual_case_intervention: "governance_does_not_decide_disputes"
prospective_changes_only: "rule_changes_apply_to_future_disputes"
notice_requirements: "changes_announced_in_advance"
rule_amendment:
proposal:
who_may_propose: "governance_body" | "participant_petition"
requirements: [rationale, draft_language, impact_assessment]
review:
comment_period: <duration>
revision: "based_on_comments"
adoption:
voting: <per_governance_structure>
threshold: <majority, supermajority, consensus>
effective_date:
notice_period: <minimum_advance_notice>
pending_disputes: "old_rules_apply"
adjudicator_oversight:
performance_review:
metrics: [appeal_rate, reversal_rate, confidence_calibration, bias_metrics]
frequency: <quarterly, annually>
threshold: <performance_standards>
certification_renewal:
required: <annually, on_material_change>
process: <re_evaluation_against_standards>
decertification:
grounds: [performance_below_threshold, bias_detected, integrity_breach]
process: [notice, opportunity_to_respond, governance_decision]
effect: "adjudicator_removed_from_available_pool"
transparency:
published:
rules: "current_and_historical_versions"
fee_schedule: "current"
adjudicator_roster: "with_performance_metrics"
system_statistics: [volume, outcomes_by_type, appeal_rates, reversal_rates]
governance_decisions: "meeting_minutes_and_decisions"
audit_rights:
participants: "may_request_audit_of_own_disputes"
external: "periodic_independent_audit_of_system"
temporal_consistency:
rule_version:
applicable: "version_in_effect_at_dispute_initiation"
exceptions: "procedural_rules_may_update_mid_dispute_if_not_prejudicial"
adjudicator_version:
applicable: "version_certified_at_adjudicator_selection"
mid_dispute_updates: "not_applied_to_pending_disputes"
Adversarial robustness
Parties will attempt to exploit the system. Design must anticipate strategic behavior.
Attack vectors and mitigations:
| Attack | Description | Detection | Mitigation | Residual risk |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Evidence fabrication | Party submits forged documents or false statements | Cross-reference failure; metadata inconsistency; external verification | Authentication requirements; fraud penalties; adverse inference | Sophisticated fabrication may escape detection |
| Strategic framing | Party phrases claims to trigger favorable rule interpretation | Pattern analysis across disputes; reviewer training | Rule design minimizing framing sensitivity; adjudicator training | Some framing effects unavoidable |
| Volume abuse | Party files many frivolous disputes to burden counterparty | Filing rate monitoring; outcome tracking | Filing fees; frivolity penalties; rate limits | Wealthy parties can absorb costs |
| Deadline manipulation | Party delays to impose costs or extract settlement | Deadline enforcement | Strict deadlines; default judgment; no extensions without cause | Legitimate delays may be punished |
| Model probing | Party tests AI to discover exploitable patterns | Rate limiting; pattern detection | Input monitoring; model rotation; behavioral analysis | Determined adversary may succeed over time |
| Precedent manipulation | Parties collude to establish favorable precedent | Outcome pattern analysis; relationship analysis | Human review of precedent-setting decisions; anomaly detection | Sophisticated collusion difficult to detect |
| Appeal abuse | Party appeals to delay enforcement | Appeal pattern analysis | Appeal fees; sanctions for frivolous appeals; expedited procedures | Legitimate appeals may be chilled |
| Confidentiality breach | Party leaks dispute information | Audit logging; external monitoring | Confidentiality terms with penalties; access controls | Detection may be impossible |
| Arbiter shopping | Party manipulates adjudicator selection | Verifiable random selection; rotation | Random selection with verification; limited party influence | Selection mechanism must be trusted |
Structural defenses:
adversarial_defense:
input_controls:
schema_enforcement: "reject_malformed_submissions"
size_limits: "prevent_resource_exhaustion"
rate_limits:
per_party: <max_disputes_per_period>
escalating: "limits_tighten_after_frivolous_findings"
behavioral_monitoring:
filing_patterns:
metrics: [frequency, timing, outcomes, counterparty_patterns]
anomaly_detection: <statistical_thresholds>
outcome_patterns:
by_party: "unusual_win_loss_patterns"
by_counterparty_pair: "repeated_disputes_between_same_parties"
by_claim_type: "claim_type_shifts_suggesting_gaming"
cross_dispute_correlation:
collusion_indicators: [coordinated_timing, complementary_claims, mutual_benefit_patterns]
deterrence:
frivolity_penalties:
determination: "by_adjudicator_at_any_stage"
consequences: [cost_shifting, fee_increase, rate_limit_reduction]
fraud_penalties:
determination: "by_adjudicator_or_governance"
consequences: [adverse_judgment, system_exclusion, external_referral]
repeat_offender:
tracking: "across_disputes"
escalation: "progressive_penalties"
model_protection:
input_sanitization: "prevent_injection_attacks"
inference_isolation: "no_network_access_during_inference"
version_management:
rotation: "periodic_model_updates"
notice: "updates_announced; pending_disputes_use_old_version"
multi_model:
when: "high_stakes_or_sensitive_disputes"
diversity: "different_training_data_or_architectures"
disagreement_handling: "escalate_or_tiebreaker"
Legitimacy maintenance
Efficiency without acceptance produces decisions that are ignored. Legitimacy requires ongoing attention.
Legitimacy sources and mechanisms:
| Source | Description | Mechanism | Measurement |
|---|---|---|---|
| Procedural fairness | Parties had opportunity to participate meaningfully | Notice; adequate time; neutral adjudicator; transparent rules | Survey; complaint rate |
| Outcome accuracy | Decisions correctly apply rules to facts | Reasoning requirements; appeal availability; reversal tracking | Appeal rate; reversal rate |
| Consistency | Similar cases produce similar outcomes | Precedent system; adjudicator training; bias monitoring | Outcome variance analysis |
| Explicability | Parties understand why they won or lost | Reasoning requirements; plain language summaries | Comprehension testing; feedback |
| Accountability | Errors have consequences; system improves | Adjudicator review; decertification; rule updates | Error correction rate |
| Consent | Parties chose this system; alternatives exist | Opt-in enrollment; opt-out availability | Participation trends |
| Neutrality | No systematic advantage to any party class | Bias monitoring; diverse governance | Outcome parity metrics |
legitimacy_monitoring:
metrics:
participation:
enrollment_rate: <new_participants_per_period>
retention_rate: <continued_participation>
exit_rate: <departures_per_period>
exit_reasons: <surveyed_or_inferred>
satisfaction:
post_dispute_survey: <winner_and_loser_separately>
net_promoter: <would_recommend>
complaint_rate: <formal_complaints_per_dispute>
compliance:
voluntary_compliance_rate: <decisions_complied_without_enforcement>
enforcement_required_rate: <decisions_requiring_enforcement>
non_compliance_rate: <decisions_not_complied_despite_enforcement>
external:
media_coverage: <sentiment_analysis>
regulatory_attention: <inquiries_or_actions>
academic_assessment: <independent_evaluations>
thresholds:
warning: <metric_levels_triggering_review>
intervention: <metric_levels_triggering_action>
responses:
to_declining_participation: "fee_reduction; rule_simplification; outreach"
to_low_satisfaction: "process_review; reasoning_quality_audit; feedback_incorporation"
to_low_compliance: "enforcement_mechanism_review; legitimacy_investigation"
to_external_criticism: "transparent_response; independent_audit"
escalation:
if_legitimacy_metrics_below_threshold:
options:
pause_ai_only_adjudication: "revert_to_human_ai_hybrid"
reduce_scope: "lower_stakes_limits; narrow_dispute_types"
governance_review: "comprehensive_system_assessment"
stakeholder_consultation: "gather_input_for_redesign"
Failure modes and recovery
| Failure mode | Detection | Containment | Recovery | Prevention improvement |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AI produces incorrect outcome | Appeal reversal | Decision reversed; parties made whole if possible | Precedent corrected; model reviewed | Improve training; tighten escalation triggers |
| AI produces unexplainable reasoning | Reasoning audit; appeal on reasoning grounds | Decision vacated; remanded or re-adjudicated | Reasoning requirements tightened | Require explanation validation before decision release |
| Evidence fraud undetected | Post-decision discovery; external report | Judgment reopened if material | Fraudster penalized; judgment corrected | Improve detection; increase authentication requirements |
| Party successfully games AI | Outcome anomaly; post-hoc analysis | Specific decisions reviewed | Model updated; attack vector closed | Adversarial testing; behavioral monitoring |
| Systematic bias detected | Bias monitoring metrics | Affected decisions reviewed; model suspended | Model audited; retraining or replacement; affected parties compensated if feasible | Diverse training data; bias testing in certification |
| AI model compromised | Attestation mismatch; outcome anomaly | System halted; all decisions during period flagged | Model replaced; affected decisions reviewed; root cause analysis | Supply chain security; multi-model verification |
| Human arbiter supply exhausted | Escalation backlog growth | Triage; emergency arbiter recruitment; scope reduction | Expand arbiter pool; adjust escalation criteria | Arbiter pipeline; workload forecasting |
| Legitimacy collapse | Participation decline; compliance decline; external criticism | Pause or reduce AI authority; stakeholder engagement | System redesign; trust rebuilding; possibly restart under new governance | Ongoing legitimacy monitoring; early intervention |
| Collusion to manipulate precedent | Pattern analysis; anomaly detection | Affected precedent quarantined | Precedent reviewed and corrected; colluders penalized | Human review of precedent-setting decisions |
| Enforcement mechanism fails | Execution failure rate | Alternative mechanisms; manual intervention | Mechanism repair or replacement; affected parties notified | Redundant mechanisms; execution monitoring |
Limitations and scope
This system is appropriate for:
- Disputes where parties have pre-existing relationship or shared context (contracts, platform terms, protocol rules)
- Disputes where evidence is primarily documentary or digital
- Disputes where remedies can be executed through integrated mechanisms
- Repeated interactions where reputation matters
- Stakes where resolution cost under this system is less than stakes
This system is not appropriate for:
- Single-shot interactions with no ongoing relationship or reputation stake
- Disputes requiring physical evidence examination
- Disputes requiring witness credibility assessment beyond document analysis
- Disputes where parties have grossly asymmetric resources and no balancing mechanism
- Disputes implicating criminal liability or government action
- Disputes where enforcement requires legal compulsion unavailable to this system
- Fully adversarial environments where parties have no stake in system continuation
Known limitations:
- Jurisdictional constraints: Enforcement depends on mechanism integration; cross-border enforcement and enforcement requiring legal authority depend on external systems
- Party asymmetry: Repeat players accumulate knowledge; well-resourced parties can submit more evidence and absorb costs; design mitigates but does not eliminate asymmetry
- AI capability limits: Current AI adjudicators have bounded ability to assess credibility, interpret ambiguous language, and handle novel situations; escalation to humans is a design feature, not a failure
- Confidence calibration: AI confidence scores are approximations; calibration methods have known limitations; confidence should inform, not dictate, escalation decisions
- Anonymization limits: Precedent anonymization reduces but does not eliminate re-identification risk; parties with dispute-specific knowledge may recognize cases
- Adversarial limits: Sophisticated, well-resourced adversaries may find exploits; system assumes most parties most of the time act within bounds
Connection to core invariants
This system instantiates the structural requirements of a high-trust regime:
- Scoped assumptions: AI adjudicator authority is bounded by stakes, dispute type, confidence threshold, and party consent. Assumptions about party behavior (evidence authenticity, good faith) are backed by deterrence mechanisms, not relied upon unconditionally.
- Compositional validity: Individual dispute resolutions compose into consistent precedent. Multi-party disputes decompose into bilateral findings that aggregate coherently. Adjudicator configurations compose (panel decisions, sequential review) without contradiction.
- Cost asymmetry: Good-faith participation is inexpensive—submit evidence, accept outcomes, comply with decisions. Exploitation is expensive—fraud penalties, frivolity sanctions, reputation damage, exclusion. The asymmetry is structural, not dependent on detection of every violation.
- Failure localization: An incorrect decision in one dispute is correctable on appeal without invalidating unrelated decisions. AI adjudicator error in one case does not discredit all AI adjudication. Precedent later found erroneous can be corrected without reopening all cases that relied on it.
- Reversion capability: If AI adjudication loses legitimacy or exhibits systematic failure, the system can contract—increase human involvement, reduce stakes limits, narrow dispute types—without abandoning the rule sets, precedent corpus, or enforcement mechanisms. The regime degrades gracefully rather than collapsing.
The dispute resolution protocol achieves high trust not by assuming participants are trustworthy, but by constructing an environment where trustworthy behavior is rewarded, untrustworthy behavior is penalized, errors are correctable, and the system can adapt when assumptions prove wrong.